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ABSTRACT
Attacks on information security continue to result in large losses for organizations.
Oftentimes, the breaches occur because organizational insiders fail to adhere to commonplace
system security messages. This could be because, faced with the challenges and time demands of
everyday stressors, security policy compliance can be costly for individuals; security actions
require time and distract attention from other primary tasks. To defend against these attacks, user
interactions with security messages need to be better understood.
This study reports the results of a 110-participant MTurk field study that examines user
interactions with interruptive security messages through the lens of a risk tradeoff paradigm.
First, a gap in the information security literature is identified, wherein findings about low
security-message attention are contrasted against studies that assume attention and information
processing. Three competing hypotheses are proposed that describe different patterns of risk
analysis that users may engage in when interacting with an interruptive security message: (1)
very little to no elaboration over the risk-taking decision due to perniciously low attention, (2)
consistent security message risk-taking decision elaboration, and (3) a bimodal situation where
elaboration depends on the information security risk-reward tradeoff balance. Multiple
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behavioral dependent variables are corroborated to support the third hypothesis, suggesting the
existence of a bimodal risk tradeoff paradigm for user interactions with interruptive security
messages. The relevance of the findings for research and practice are discussed.
Keywords: interruptive security messages, risk tradeoff, heuristic-systematic model, attention
INTRODUCTION
Abundant stories in media reports about organizations falling victim to security hacks
describe huge financial and operational damage from those attacks. While the victims would
often have the public believe that these hacks are the result of “highly sophisticated” attack
vectors (Gallagher 2016), the reality is that the breaches often grow from simple inlets, including
users who fail to observe basic security policies such as using caution when opening unsolicited
email attachments. Even simple social engineering attack vectors such as these can have
disastrous, potentially life-threatening consequences. For example, security researchers have
observed devastating ransomware being delivered via phishing attacks and infected software and
documents (Goodin 2016). These attacks count on users to ignore commonplace security
messages, such as the Microsoft Office macro warning (Goodin 2016; Schneier 2011).
Information security research has explored why individuals violate security policies and
fall victim to attacks. Some studies make an underlying assumption that users make active risktaking assessments for every security decision, prompted by security messages (Boss et al. 2015;
Johnston et al. 2015). A “lazy user” perspective depicts security as an unnecessary burden that
should be bypassed if possible. Many studies use deterrence theory, testing the efficacy of using
sanctions to influence security-related decision making (e.g., D'Arcy and Herath 2011; Johnston
et al. 2015). Another camp takes the position that “users are not the enemy” (Adams and Sasse
1999), eschewing criminology-inspired sanctioning deterrence, and attributing security

Proceedings of the 11th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Dublin, Ireland December 10, 2016

2

Eargle et al./ Applying risk tradeoff paradigms to explain user interactions with interruptive security messages

misbehavior largely to inattention and habituation (e.g., Anderson et al. 2016a; Anderson et al.
2016c). In this view, if a security message is ignored, the design of the interface is to blame. We
question how these two stances coexist – purposeful risk-taking security decision making does
not seem congruous with inattentive dismissal of security messages.
The purpose of this study is to attempt to reconcile the differences between the two
camps of research on user interactions with security messages. In our study, we employ a
between-subjects repeated-measures field study using Amazon Mechanical Turk with 110
subjects. In our design, we influence the risk-taking tradeoff by varying the value of adhering to
security messages. Corroborating several dependent variables, including security choice, reaction
times, and mouse-cursor movements measures, we discover an interesting bimodal pattern where
elevated attention and risk-taking elaboration are present only until the risk tradeoff passes a
certain threshold.
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
SECURITY MESSAGE INATTENTION
A major contributor to security message failure is a simple lack of attention (see
Anderson et al. 2016b). Inattention to security messages has been attributed to a neurobiological
process wherein users reach a state of habituation after repeated exposure: when presented with a
security message, a user draws on memory to inform a response instead of actively reviewing
and elaborating the current message. While habituation has been blamed in several studies for
observed security message disregard (Bravo-Lillo et al. 2014; Bravo-Lillo et al. 2013), NeuroIS
tools including fMRI (Anderson et al. 2016c) and eye tracking (Anderson et al. 2016a) have
directly measured habituation processes and reliance on memory. Changing the appearance of
the warning message has been effective in combatting habituation (Anderson et al. 2016c).
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Alarmingly, some of the studies have found no differences in user reactions to security
messages even when the severity of the communicated threat is increased (e.g., Bravo-Lillo et al.
2014; Schechter et al. 2007). However, these studies do not claim that users perceive higher
levels of threat despite the message having changed. Indeed, often in these studies, nuanced
changes are not perceived at all due to habituation’s recall rather than active processing of
changed stimuli.
Drawing on these attention findings, one possible pattern is that users rarely engage in
risk-taking assessments when interacting with security messages, regardless of varying levels of
tradeoff in the risk-taking decision. This would suggest that users are habituated to the messages,
and are performing automatic, learned responses when encountering new ones. If this is true,
then research should focus mainly on fostering attention to the messages, so as to increase the
likelihood that users will engage with the messages and make meaningful choices.
H1: There will be no difference in markers of cognition between varying risk-taking
tradeoff levels (i.e., there will be no evidence of risk-taking assessments).
RISK TRADEOFFS
Risk has been studied in an information security context typically through the lens of
protection motivation theory (Rogers 1983), wherein the constructs of threat severity and threat
susceptibility essentially represent the security threat’s risk levels (Boss et al. 2015; Johnston et
al. 2015; Johnston and Warkentin 2010). Individual differences in risk perceptions have also
been used to predict security message disregard (Vance et al. 2014).
In this study, we consider a different facet of information security risk -- the risk tradeoff
associated with adhering to the security message. Inherent in the idea of risk is that there is
something to be gained from taking the risk. In the finance literature, risk tradeoff is quantifiable
as the potential return on investment, with willingness to accept the risk being a function of the
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magnitude of the return (Ghysels et al. 2005). This same concept of risk-taking behavior being
positively associated with the potential gains or loss-avoidance involved has also been described
in the behavioral economics literature (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Risk-tradeoff applies to the context of information security messages in that one risks a
security threat in exchange for some benefit. Guo et al. (2011) captures the motivation to
intentionally violate organizational information security policies with their "relative advantage
for job performance [from violating a policy]" measure. Interruptive security messages often
block or hinder users from completing their primary tasks (Jenkins et al. 2016). Observance of
the security policy adds stress and requires more effort to complete the primary task. Failing to
complete the task or taking longer to complete it may lead to poor employee performance
evaluations (Lowry and Moody 2015). To capture these tradeoffs, we will vary the “penalties”
associated with heeding the message, while holding constant security threat severity and
susceptibility.
We use the risk-taking paradigm to propose an alternative to H1, wherein users nearly
always engage in risk-taking assessments when encountering security messages, with the degree
of security decision elaboration depending on the tradeoff weights. This view assumes that
attention is sufficiently present to prompt risk-tradeoff appraisals, and supports studying the
impact of levels of perceived risk on users’ security message risk-taking assessments. Those
tradeoff assessments can be discerned if greater evidence of elaboration and cognition is present
as the tradeoff scale is increasingly tipped.
H2: The pattern of risk-taking will be linear: the markers of cognition will linearly
increase, dependent on the level of risk-taking tradeoff.
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COGNITIVE ELABORATION AS A FUNCTION OF RISK-TRADEOFF BALANCE
The third hypothesis combines aspects of the first two, drawing from principles of the
heuristic-systematic model of information processing (HSM) (Chen and Chaiken 1999) to
predict whether a user will cognitively engage with a security warning. HSM, a theory of
persuasion, finds early expression in the script concept (Abelson 1981). The script concept
asserts that an individual will follow a “script” and grant small requests without cognitive
elaboration, as long as a reason is given. Individuals will be likely to perform this script unless
(1) the script is broken by not providing a reason or if (2) the request is large, in which case they
will elaborate over the request and the reason before deciding whether to accept it.
We predict that the perceived risks involved will impact whether or not a user elaborates
over a security-message decision. To our knowledge, while HSM has been evaluated in a risk
judgement paradigm (Trumbo 2002), the impact of the balance of the risk tradeoff has not been
examined in an HSM frame. We will manipulate the risks involved for heeding the warning. If
the script theory concept or HSM elaboration prediction holds, we expect to see a bimodal
distribution of behavior across risk levels, where after a certain threshold of risk tradeoff for
adhering to the message is surpassed, elaboration will be much less likely. From the habituationtheory lens, the scripted behavior would rely on memory and pay little attention to the security
message (c.f. Böhme and Köpsell 2010; Sunshine et al. 2009). The tradeoff behavior will involve
whatever task was interrupted by the security message. If adhering to the message will not
adversely impact the interrupted task, elaboration over the decision should be more likely to
occur. In summary, we posit that if users perceive that the benefits of heeding a warning are
close to the accompanying losses (e.g., time lost or inability to complete an objective), then they
will more carefully consider the risk tradeoff before making a decision. However, if the tradeoff
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choice is clear, then users will be less likely to engage in elaboration, and instead their behavior
will more closely follow patterns of lower attention and automatic choices.
H3: The pattern of risk-taking will be modal. The risk decision will be elaborated over,
as long as a threshold of risk-benefit balance has not been exceeded.
We note that our hypotheses are mutually exclusive. They each describe different
patterns of attention and risk-taking assessments that users may follow.
METHODOLOGY
We used a field study with a between-subjects repeated-measures design. We recruited
110 participants from the United States using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. Participants
were directed to a server under our control running our experiment codebase, built on the
psiTurk framework (McDonnell et al. 2012), where they were randomly assigned to one of three
treatment groups. Data from Mechanical Turk has been found to be as reliable as data from other
U.S. survey panels (Steelman et al. 2014), and more importantly, they are likely to be using their
own computers, raising their sense of perceived risk (c.f. Boss et al. 2015; Vance et al. 2014).
We used an IRB-approved deception protocol. The pretense was that participants were
performing an image classification task, when in reality, we were interested in users’ behaviors
when they were presented with interruptive security messages. The image classification ruse and
the security warning presentation are described below.
Participants performed a modified version of the image classification task described in
Vance et al. (2014). In our task, participants were told that they would classify a series of images
in order to help test a computer classification algorithm. It was explained that a series of live,
external websites would be loaded into a frame in the center of the webpage (i.e., an iframe
HTML element). For each page load, participants were asked to classify whether the image was
a photograph of Batman or an artist’s rendering. On top of a $1.00 base payment, participants
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were offered an additional $1.00 performance-based bonus payment. Each incorrect
classification results in a “penalty” decrease in their bonus payment, with the penalty amount
depending on a participant’s treatment group. Three penalty level treatment groups were used: 5,
10, and 25 cents. We chose these increments because they mapped naturally to U.S. coinage.
Furthermore, to encourage attention to the task, we warned that too many incorrect responses
would result in their work being rejected with forfeiture of any payment. Participants’ current
bonus status was depicted with an animated and labeled bar beneath the central iframe.
Participants were encouraged to move quickly, limiting them to a maximum of 10 seconds for
each classification. A timeout resulted in the classification being marked as “incorrect.” After a
4-image practice round, participants classified 75 images. See Figure 1 for an example
screenshot of the image classification protocol.
Five times during the task, the page load within the central window was interrupted with
a browser security warning. The warning, based on Google Chrome malware warning build
51.0.2704.63 m, signaled that continuing to load the page would result in the visitor’s computer
becoming infected with malicious software (“malware”). The warning had a button allowing the
user to proceed past the warning to the website (see Figure 2).
If, while a security warning was shown, participants made a guess about whether the
image on the unseen screen was real or animated, they risked being marked wrong. Because each
incorrect classification decreased the bonus earned and increased the likelihood of a participant’s
work being rejected, participants were financially motivated to ignore the warning.
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Figure 1 – Example of image classification task
demonstrating loaded page window and task
control panel (adapted from Vance et al. 2014).

Figure 2 – The security warning as it appeared to
participants. Based on the Google Chrome malware
warning, from build version 51.0.2704.63 m

METRICS
We consider various markers of security behaviors and cognition. First, we test for differences in
actual security message adherence (choosing to load the site despite the warning) among
treatment groups. Second, we test for differences in reaction time among treatment groups.
Reaction time, a form of mental chronology, is a commonly-used metric for cognitive effort
(Jensen 2006). Third, we test for differences in cognitive engagement by examining area under
the curve (AUC), a mouse-cursor movement statistic (Hibbeln et al. 2016; Jenkins et al. 2016).
For AUC, the more the line connecting the mouse cursor starting and ending point for a security
warning impression deviated from a straight-line trajectory, the greater the evidence of higher
levels of cognitive processing.
RESULTS
WARNING ADHERENCE RATES
To test for differences in adherence rates (whether a participant ignored a warning), we
performed an empirical logit analysis (Barr 2008). We specified a fixed effect for treatment
group, a fixed effect for the number of warnings seen, and a random intercept for each
participant. An ANOVA found significant differences among treatment groups on whether the
warning was ignored, 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝜒 2 (2) = 11.502, 𝑝 = .003. Averaged across warning exposures,
participants in the 5-cent penalty treatment group were 32% less likely to ignore the warning
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than were participants in the 10-cent penalty treatment group (𝑝 = .001), and 39% less likely to
ignore the warning than participants in the 25-cent penalty treatment group (𝑝 < .001).
However, there were no significant differences among log odds comparing the 10-cent group to
the 25-cent group. Furthermore, while there was an overall 5% increase in the odds of ignoring
the warning for each additional warning exposure (𝑝 = .021), there was no interaction between
treatment group and number of warnings seen (𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝜒 2 (2) = .875, 𝑝 = .646). Model
parameters are graphically displayed in Figure 3.
REACTION TIME
We tested for the impact of treatment group on a log transformation of reaction time
using a linear mixed model with random intercept for each participant, along with fixed effects
for treatment condition, number of warnings seen, plus an interaction between the fixed effects.
Significant differences were found on time taken among the treatment groups, 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝜒 2 (2) =
7.684, 𝑝 = .022. Averaging across warning exposures, participants in the 5-cent treatment group
had 22.7% slower reaction times than did participants in the 10-cent treatment group (𝑝 = .008),
and 15.1% slower reaction times than participants in the 25-cent treatment group, (𝑝 = .075).
There were no significant differences between reaction times averaged across warning exposures
for participants in the 10-cent group compared to the 25-cent treatment group (𝑝 = .430). Also,
the interaction effect of penalty treatment and number of warnings seen was not statistically
significant, 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝜒 2 (2) = 1.642, 𝑝 = .440. See Figure 4.
MOUSE-CURSOR MOVEMENT
We performed analyses on the log-transformation of the length-normalized AUC. For our
first analysis of this dependent variable, we only considered the first warning exposure for each
participant. Significant differences were found among the treatment groups on AUC, 𝐹(2,95) =
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3.198, 𝑝 = .045. Post-hoc analyses indicated that participants in the 5-cent treatment group had
marginally higher AUC than did participants in either the 10-cent treatment group or the 25-cent
treatment group (𝑝 = .055 and 𝑝 = .022 respectively). No significant differences were found in
AUC between participants in the 10- and 25-cent treatment groups (𝑝 = .681).
Next, we added a fixed effect to the model, counting each warning seen for each
participant, a fixed effect for the interaction between treatment group and number of warnings
seen, plus a random intercept for each participant. Unlike the first analysis, this analysis only
found the main effect of number of warnings seen to be significant (𝜒 2 (1) = 16.559, 𝑝 < .001).
Neither the interaction effect nor the main effect of treatment group were found to be significant
(p = .295 and p = .205 respectively). See the Loess curve in Figure 5.
DISCUSSION
We tested for differences on various outcomes: (1) actual adherence rates, (2) reaction
times, and (3) mouse cursor movement AUC. For the actual adherence rates, participants who
were only penalized 5 cents per incorrect answer were much less likely to ignore the warning
than participants who were penalized either 10-cents or 25-cents per incorrect response. This was
expected – a penalty of 10 cents and 25 cents represented losses of 10% and 25% of the available
$1.00 bonus that participants stood to earn, respectively. Using a risk tradeoff paradigm,

Figure 3 – Empirical logistic
regression for did_ignore

Figure 4 – Loess curve for
reaction time, untransformed DV

Figure 5 – Loess curve of AUC
over repeated exposures
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participants appeared to be more likely to trade 5% of their bonus to avoid a security risk than
they were to trade either 10% or 25%. One interesting observation is that there were no observed
differences in adherence rates between the 10-cent and 25-cent treatment groups. This suggests
that the risk-analysis tradeoff that individuals engage in is not linear, but rather, that it is modal,
supporting H3. In this study, a 10% penalty – a mere 5% increase over the lower treatment group
– was sufficient to boost substantially the rates of ignoring security warning–by 20%. Individuals
at work may engage in these risk-taking tradeoffs when they are interrupted by security
messages. Time lost through adhering to the security warning and finding a workaround may
result in negative outcomes such as missing a work deadline. Depending on the weight of these
negative outcomes compared to the perceived benefits of avoiding the security threat, similar
warning adherence patterns as seen in our study may be observed in the workplace.
By comparing these results to our other outcome measures indicative of attention and
cognitive processing across treatment groups, we gain insights into the level of cognition and
attention that participants exhibited. Participants in the 5-cent treatment group had the longest
reaction times to the warnings, even across multiple exposures. All else equal, longer reaction
times in decision-making are suggestive of greater levels of attention and cognition (Jensen
2006). Therefore, the faster reaction times in the 10-cent and 25-cent penalty groups suggest that
participants viewed their choice as being more straightforward. The same pattern of results
between treatment groups was seen in the analysis of mouse-cursor movement AUC for first
warning impressions. We know from the analysis of the adherence data that participants were
more likely to ignore the warning in these higher penalty groups. We can therefore begin to
make the case that automatic, mindless reactions to security messages are more likely after a risk
tradeoff threshold is surpassed. But, participants apparently do not indiscriminately ignore all

Proceedings of the 11th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Dublin, Ireland December 10, 2016

12

Eargle et al./ Applying risk tradeoff paradigms to explain user interactions with interruptive security messages

warnings. Participants in the 5-cent treatment group appeared to be more likely to engage in riskbenefit tradeoff decision-making and to elaborate over the security decisions. In short,
participants do not always respond mindlessly to security messages, rejecting H1. But these
results suggest that they often do, rejecting H2.
It is worth nothing that when differences were tested for AUC averaged across time, no
differences were found. Only the differences in group intercepts (the first warning impressions)
were statistically significant. This may be explained by participants only engaging in the risktaking elaboration once. Future security warning decisions may have been similar enough to the
first that re-elaboration was not necessary. This observation of a decrease in elaboration over
repeated exposures is in line with the principle of habituation to security messages (c.f. Anderson
et al. 2016a; Anderson et al. 2016b; Anderson et al. 2016c).
A greater number of treatment groups would be necessary to determine the number of
modes for interruptive security warning risk-taking decisions. For situations where the tradeoff
quantification is less immediately quantifiable than our money-penalty operationalization, a
model would be useful to describe what perceptual factors best predict the tradeoff values that
participants use when they engage in evaluation of the security message risk-taking tradeoff.
Such a model could build on the information security policy violation intention models already
in existence (e.g., D'Arcy and Herath 2011). Organizations can modify their incentive structures
to decrease the tradeoff amount that organizational insiders discern when considering whether to
adhere to a warning, perhaps through threat of sanctions for non-security-message adherence
(D'Arcy and Herath 2011; Johnston et al. 2015), or through rewards for good security hygiene.
Security message design can also aim to boost perceptions of threat severity and susceptibility,
which may also tip the risk-tradeoff decision further.
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CONCLUSION
This study has investigated a gap in information security literature between assumptions
of high and low user attention to interruptive security messages. Using an interruptive security
message context, the corroboration of multiple dependent variables from a field study supported
the existence of users behaving under a bimodal risk tradeoff paradigm, where security message
elaboration was dependent on the risk tradeoff balance between the perceived information threat
and the losses involved in not being able to perform the interrupted task. Future research should
be performed to further investigate users’ risk perceptions when interacting with interruptive
security messages, including how to manipulate these perceptions. This line of inquiry holds
great promise for both research and practice.
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